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Introduction and summary
Economists continue to debate the causes of inflation.
One reason for this is that bad economic outcomes are
frequently accompanied by anomalous inflation behav-
ior. The worst economic performance in the U.S. in the
twentieth century occurred during the Great Depression
of the 1930s, and there was a pronounced deflation at
that time. Economic performance in the U.S. in the
1970s was also weak, and that was associated with a
pronounced inflation.
So, what is it that makes inflation sometimes high
and sometimes low? In one sense, there is widespread
agreement. Most economists think that inflation cannot
be unusually high or low for long, without the fuel of
high or low money growth.1 But, this just shifts the ques-
tion back one level. What accounts for the anomalous
behavior of money growth?
Academic economists attempting to understand
the dynamics of inflation pursue a particular strategy.
They start by studying the dynamic characteristics of
inflation data, as well as of related variables. These char-
acteristics represent a key input into building and re-
fining a model of the macroeconomy. The economist’s
model must not only do a good job in capturing the be-
havior of the private economy, but it must also explain
the behavior of monetary authorities. The hoped-for final
product of this research is a model that fits the facts
well. Implicit in such a model is an “explanation” of
the behavior of inflation, as well as a prescription for
what is to be done to produce better outcomes.2
To date, much research has focused on data from
the period since World War II. For example, considerable
attention and controversy have been focused on the
apparent inflation “inertia” in these data: the fact that
inflation seems to respond only with an extensive delay
to exogenous shifts in monetary policy.3 We argue that
much can be learned by incorporating data from the
first half of the century into the analysis. The data from
the early part of the century behave quite differently
in many ways from the data we are accustomed to study-
ing. In particular, we emphasize four differences be-
tween the pre- and post-war data:4
■ Inflation is much more volatile, and less persistent,
in the first half of the twentieth century.
■ Average inflation is lower in the first half of the
century.
■ Money growth and inflation are coincident in the
first half of the century, while inflation lags money
by about two years in the second half.
■ Finally, inflation and unemployment are strongly
negatively related in the first half of the century,
while in the second half a positive relationship
emerges, at least in the lower frequency components
of the data.
These shifts in the behavior of inflation constitute
potentially valuable input in the quest for a good model.
The outline of our article is as follows. To set the
background, we begin with a brief, very selective, over-
view of existing theories about inflation. We divide the
set of theories into two groups: those that focus on
“people” and those that focus on “institutions.” We
describe the very different implications that each group
of theories has for policy. We then turn to documenting
the facts listed above. After that, we review the implica-
tions of the facts for theories. We focus in particular
on the institution view. According to this view, what23 Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
is crucial to achieving good inflation outcomes is the
proper design of monetary policy institutions. Our dis-
cussion reviews ideas initially advanced by Kydland
and Prescott (1977) and later developed further by Barro
and Gordon (1983a, b), who constructed a beautifully
simple model for expositing the ideas. We show that
the Barro–Gordon model does very well at understand-
ing the second and fourth facts above concerning in-
flation in the twentieth century.5 We also discuss the
well-known fact that that model has some difficulty
in addressing the disinflation that occurred in the U.S.
in the 1980s. This and other considerations motivate
us to turn to modern representations of the ideas of
Kydland–Prescott and Barro–Gordon. While this work
is at an early stage, it does contain some surprises and
may lead to improved theories that provide a better
explanation of the inflation facts.
Ideas about inflation: People versus
institutions
Economists are currently pursuing several theories
for understanding inflation behavior. However, the
theories are still in their infancy and are best thought
of as “prototypes”: They are too simple to be credibly
thought of as fitting the facts well. Although these re-
search programs are still at an early stage, it is possible to
see two visions emerging. Each has different implications
for what needs to be done to achieve better inflation out-
comes. To understand what is at stake in this research,
it is interesting to sketch the different visions. Our loose
names for the competing visions are the people vision
on the one hand and the institution vision on the other.
Although it is not the case that all research neatly falls
into one or the other of these categories, they are never-
theless useful for spelling out the issues.
Under the people vision, bad inflation outcomes
of the past reflect the honest mistakes of well-mean-
ing central bankers trying to do what is inherently a
very difficult job. For example, Orphanides (1999)
has argued that the high inflation of the 1970s reflects
that policymakers viewed the low output of the time
as a cyclical phenomenon, something monetary poli-
cy could and should correct. However, in retrospect
we now know that the poor economic performance of
the time reflected a basic productivity slowdown that
was beyond the power of the central bank to control.
According to Orphanides, real-time policymakers under
a mistaken impression about the sources of the slow-
down did their best to heat up the economy with high
money growth. To their chagrin, they got only high
inflation and no particular improvement to the econ-
omy. From this perspective, the high inflation of the
1970s was a blunder.
Another explanation of the high inflation of the
1970s that falls into what we call the people category
appears in Clarida, Gali, and Gertler (1998). They char-
acterize monetary policy using a framework advocated
by Taylor (1993): Fed policy implements a “Taylor rule”
under which it raises interest rates when expected in-
flation is high, and lowers them when expected infla-
tion is low. According to Clarida, Gali, and Gertler,
the Fed’s mistake in the 1970s was to implement a ver-
sion of the Taylor rule in which interest rates were
moved too little in response to movements in expected
inflation. They argue that this type of mistake can ac-
count for the inflation take-off that occurred in the U.S.
in the 1970s.6 In effect the root of the problem in the
1970s lay in a bad Taylor rule. According to the insti-
tution view, limitations on central bankers’ technical
knowledge about the mechanics of avoiding high in-
flation are not the key reason for the bad inflation out-
comes that have occurred in the past. This view
implicitly assumes that achieving a given inflation
target over the medium run is not a problem from a
technical standpoint. The problem, according to this
view, has to do with central bankers’ incentives to keep
inflation on track and the role of government institu-
tions in shaping those incentives.
The institution view—initiated by Kydland and
Prescott (1977) and further developed by Barro and
Gordon (1983a, b)—focuses on a particular vulnera-
bility of central banks in democratic societies (see
figure 1). If people expect inflation to be high (A), they
may take protective actions (B), which have the effect
of placing the central bank in a dilemma. On the one
hand, it can accommodate the inflationary expectations
with high money growth (C). This has the cost of pro-
ducing inflation, but the advantage of avoiding a re-
cession. On the other hand, the central bank can keep
money growth low and prevent the inflation that people
expect from occurring (D). This has the cost of pro-
ducing a recession, but the benefit that inflation does
not increase. Central bankers in a democratic society
will be tempted to accommodate (that is, choose C)
when confronted with this dilemma. If people think
this is the sort of central bank they have, this increas-
es the likelihood that A will occur in the first place.
So, what is at stake in these two visions, the people
vision versus the institution vision? Each has different
implications for what should or should not be done to
prevent bad inflation outcomes in the future. The people
vision implies that more and better research is need-
ed to reduce the likelihood of repeating past mistakes.
This research focuses more on the technical, opera-
tional aspect of monetary policy. For example, research
motivated by the Clarida, Gali, and Gertler argument24 1Q/2003, Economic Perspectives
focuses on improvements in the design of the Taylor rule
to ensure that it does not become part of the problem. The
institutional perspective, not surprisingly, asks how better
to design the institutions of monetary policy to achieve
better outcomes. This type of work contemplates the con-
sequences of, say, a legal change that makes low infla-
tion the sole responsibility of the Federal Reserve. Other
possibilities are the type of employment contracts tried in
New Zealand, which penalize the central bank governor
for poor inflation outcomes. The basic idea of this liter-
ature is to prevent scenarios like A in figure 1 from occur-
ring, by convincing private individuals that the central
bank would not choose C in the event that A did occur.
In this article, we start by presenting data on infla-
tion and unemployment and documenting how those
data changed before and after the 1960s. We argue that
these data are tough for standard versions of theories
that there is a time consistency problem in monetary
policy. We then discuss whether there may be other ver-
sions of these theories that do a better job at explain-
ing the facts.
The data
This section describes the basic data on inflation
and related variables and documents the observations
listed in the introduction. First, we study the relation-
ship between unemployment and inflation; then we
turn to money growth and inflation.
Unemployment and inflation
To show the difference between data in the first
and second parts of the twentieth century, we divide
the dataset into the periods before and after 1960. To
better characterize the movements in the data, we break
the data down into different frequency components.
The techniques for doing this, reviewed in Christiano
and Fitzgerald (1998), build on the observation that
any data series of length, say T, can be represented
exactly as the sum of T/2 artificial data series exhibiting
different frequencies of oscillation. Each data series
has two parameters: One controls the amplitude of
fluctuation and the other, phase. The parameters are
chosen so that the sum over all the artificial data series
precisely reproduces the original data. Adding over
just the data series whose frequencies lie inside the
business cycle range of frequencies yields the business
cycle component of the original data. We define the
business cycle frequencies as those that correspond to
fluctuations with period between two and eight years.
We also consider a lower frequency component of the
data, corresponding to fluctuations with period between
eight and 20 years. We consider a very low frequency
component of the data, which corresponds to fluctua-
tions with period of oscillation between 20 and 40 years.
Finally, for the post-1960 data when quarterly and
monthly observations are available, we also consider the
high frequency component of the data, which is com-
posed of fluctuations with period less than two years.7
We begin by analyzing the data from the first part
of the century. The raw data are displayed in figure 2,
panel A. That figure indicates that there is a negative
relationship between inflation and unemployment. This
is confirmed by examining the scatter plot of inflation
and unemployment in figure 2, panel B, which also
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shows a negative relationship (that is, a Phillips curve).8
The regression line displayed in figure 2, panel B high-
lights this negative relationship.9 Figure 2, panels C,
D, and E exhibit the different frequency components
of the data. Note that a negative relationship is appar-
ent at all frequency components. The contemporaneous
correlations between different frequency components
of the inflation and unemployment data are reported
in table 1. In each case, the number in parentheses is
a p-value for measuring whether the indicated corre-
lation is statistically different from zero. For example,
a p-value less than 0.05 indicates that the indicated
correlation is statistically different from zero at the 5
percent level.10 The negative correlation in the business
cycle frequencies is particularly significant.
We analyze the post-1960 monthly inflation and
unemployment data in figure 3, panels A–F.11 There is
a sense in which these data look similar to what we
saw for the early period, but there is another sense in
which their behavior is quite different. To see the simi-
larity, note from the raw data in figure 3, panel A that
for frequencies in the neighborhood of the business
cycle, inflation and unemployment covary negatively.
That is, the Phillips curve seems to be a pronounced
feature of the higher frequency component of the data.
At the same time, the Phillips curve appears to have
vanished in the very lowest frequencies. The data in
figure 3, panel A show a slow trend rise in unemploy-
ment throughout the 1960s and 1970s, which is reversed
starting in early 1983. A similar pattern occurs in in-
flation, though the turnaround in inflation begins in
April 1980, roughly three years before the turnaround
in unemployment. The low frequency component of
the data dominates in the scatter plot of inflation versus
unemployment, exhibited in figure 3, panel B. That
figure suggests that the relationship between inflation
and unemployment is positive, in contrast with the
pre-1960s data, which suggest otherwise (see figure 2,
panel B).12
We can formalize and quantify our impressions
based on casual inspection of the raw data using fre-
quency components of the data, as reported in figure 3,
panels C–F. Thus, the frequency ranges corresponding
to periods of oscillation between two months and 20
years (see figure 3, panels C–E) are characterized by a
noticeable Phillips curve. Table 1 shows that the corre-
lation in the range of high frequencies (when available)
and in the business cycle frequencies is significantly
negative. The correlation between inflation and unem-
ployment is also negative in the 8–20 year range, but
it is not statistically significantly different from zero
in this case. Presumably, this reflects the relative paucity
of information about these frequencies in the post-1960s
data. Finally, figure 3, panel F indicates that the cor-
relation between 20 and 40 year components is now
positive, with unemployment lagging inflation. These
results are consistent with the hypothesis that the Phillips
curve changed relatively little in the 2–20 year frequency
range, and that the changes that did occur are primarily
concentrated in the very low frequencies. Formal tests
of this hypothesis, shown in table B1 in box 1, fail to
reject it.
Some of the observations reported above have been
reported previously. For example, the low-frequency
observations on unemployment have been document-
ed using other methods in Barro (1987, Chapter 16).
Also, similar frequency extraction methods have been
used to detect the presence of the Phillips curve in the
business cycle frequency range.13 What has not been doc-
umented is how far the Phillips curve extends into the
lowest frequencies. In addition, we show that inflation
leads unemployment in the lowest frequency range.
Finally, we noted in the introduction that inflation
in the early part of the century was more volatile and
less persistent than in the second part. We can see this
by comparing figure 2, panel A with figure 3, panel A.
We can see the observation on volatility by compar-
ing the scales on the inflation portion of the graphs.
TABLE 1
CPI inflation and unemployment correlations
High Business cycle 8–20 20–40
Sample frequency frequency years years
1900–60 (annual) –0.57 (0.00) –0.32 (0.19) –0.51 (0.23)
1961–97 (annual) –0.38 (0.11) –0.16 (0.41) 0.45 (0.32)
1961:Q2–97:Q4 (quarterly) –0.37 (0.00) –0.65 (0.00) –0.30 (0.29) 0.25 (0.34)
1961, Jan.–97, Dec. (monthly) –0.24 (0.00) –0.69 (0.00) –0.27 (0.30) 0.23 (0.40)
Notes: Contemporaneous correlation over indicated sample periods and frequencies. Numbers in parentheses are p-values, in
decimals, against the null hypothesis of zero correlation at all frequencies. For further details, see the text and notes 7 and 10.26 1Q/2003, Economic Perspectives
FIGURE 2
Unemployment and inflation, 1900–60
A. The unemployment rate and the inflation rate
percent
Note: Shaded areas indicate recessions as defined by the National Bureau of Economic Research. The black line indicates inflation
and the green line indicates unemployment.
Source: Authors’ calculations based upon data from the U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics.
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FIGURE 3
Unemployment and inflation, 1960–99
A. The unemployment rate and the inflation rate
percent
D. Frequency of 1.5 to 8 years
percent
Note: Shaded areas indicate recessions as defined by the National Bureau of Economic Research. The black line indicates inflation
and the green line indicates unemployment.
Source: Authors’ calculations based upon data from the U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics.
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In the early period, the scale extends from –12 percent
to +18 percent, at an annual rate. In the later sample,
the scale extends over a smaller range, from 0 percent
to 14 percent. In addition, the inflation data in the early
period are characterized by sharp movements followed
almost immediately by reversals in the other direction.
By contrast, in the later dataset, movements in infla-
tion in one direction are less likely to be reversed im-
mediately by movements in the other direction.
Money growth and inflation
We report our results for money growth and infla-
tion in detail in Christiano and Fitzgerald (2003), so here
we just summarize the findings. We display these re-
sults in figure 4, panels A–E and figure 5, panels A–F.
The style of analysis is much the same as for the un-
employment and inflation data.
Consider the data from the early part of the cen-
tury first. Figure 4, panel A shows that money growth
(M2) and inflation move together very closely. The re-
lationship appears to be essentially contemporaneous.
This impression of a positive relationship is confirmed
by the scatter plot between inflation and money growth
in figure 4, panel B. To the eye, the positive relation-
ship in figure 4, panel A appears to be a feature of all
the frequency components of the data. This is confirmed
in figure 4, panels C–E. Here we see the various fre-
quency components of the data and how closely the
data move together in each of them.
Now consider the data from the later part of the cen-
tury. The raw data are reported in figure 5, panel A. The
differences between these data in the early and late parts
of the century are dramatic. At first glance, it may
appear that the two variables, which moved together
so closely in the early sample, are totally unrelated in
the late sample. On closer inspection, the differences
do not seem so great after all. Thus, in the very low
frequencies there does still appear to be a positive re-
lationship. Note how money growth generally rises in
the first part of the late sample, and then falls in the
second part. Inflation follows a similar pattern. It is
in the higher frequencies that the relationship seems
to have changed the most. Whereas in the early sample,
the relationship between the two variables appeared
to be contemporaneous, now there seems to be a sig-
nificant lag. High money growth is not associated im-
mediately with high inflation, but instead is associated
with high inflation several years later. These observa-
tions, which are evident in the raw data, are confirmed
by figure 5, panels B–F. Thus, panel B shows the
scatter plot between money growth and inflation, which
exhibits a positive relationship. Clearly, this positive
relationship is dominated by the low frequency behavior
of the data. It masks the very different behavior that we
observe in the higher frequencies. Figure 5, panels D
and E show how the variables are so far out of phase
in the business cycle and lower frequencies that they
actually have a negative relationship. The strong pos-
itive and contemporaneous relationship between the very
low frequency components of the data that we noticed
in figure 5, panel A, is quite evident in panel F.
Implications of the evidence for
macroeconomic models
The differences in the time series behavior of in-
flation in the first and second parts of the last century
offer a potentially valuable source of information on
the underlying mechanisms that drive inflation. For
example, in the introduction, we talked about the re-
cent literature that focuses on explaining the apparent
inertia in inflation: the tendency for inflation to respond
slowly to shocks. These findings are based on analysis
of data from the second half of the century. We sus-
pect that similar analysis of data for the first part of
the century would find less inertia. This is because we
saw that inflation is less persistent in the early sample,
and its movements are more contemporaneous with
movements in money. These observations provide a
potentially important clue about how the private econ-
omy is put together: Whatever accounts for inflation
inertia in the second part of the century must be some-
thing that was absent in the first part. For example, some
have argued that frictions in the wage-setting process
and variability in the rate of utilization of capital have
the potential to account for the inflation inertia in post-
war data.14 If this is right, then wage-setting frictions
must be smaller in the early sample, or there must have
been greater limitations on the opportunities to achieve
short-term variation in the utilization rate of capital.
The remainder of this section focuses on the change
in the relationship between inflation and unemploy-
ment. At first glance, the change appears to lend sup-
port to the institutions view of inflation, as captured
in the work of Kydland and Prescott (1977) and Barro
and Gordon (1983a, b). A second glance suggests the
evidence is not so supportive after all. Therefore, we
begin with a brief review of the Barro-Gordon model.
Barro–Gordon model
The model comprises two basic relationships. The
first summarizes the private economy. The second sum-
marizes the behavior of the monetary authority. The
private economy is captured by the expectations-aug-
mented Phillips curve, originally associated with
Friedman (1968) and Phelps (1967):
1)  u – uN = –α(π – πe), α > 0.29 Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
BOX 1
Formally testing our hypothesis about the Phillips curve
Formal tests of the hypothesis that the Phillips curve
changed relatively little in the 2–20 year frequency
range fail to reject it. Table B1 displays p-values for
the null hypothesis that the post-1960s data on infla-
tion and unemployment are generated by the bivariate
vector autoregression (VAR) that generated the pre-
1960s data. We implement the test using 2,000 arti-
ficial post-1960s datasets obtained by simulating a
three-lag VAR and its fitted residuals estimated using
the pre-1960s unemployment and inflation data.1 In
each artificial dataset, we compute correlations be-
tween filtered inflation and unemployment just like we
did in the actual post-1960s data. Table B1 indicates
that 9 percent of correlations between the business
cycle component of inflation and unemployment ex-
ceed the –0.38 value reported in table 1 for the post-
1960s data, so that the null hypothesis fails to be
rejected at the 5 percent level. The p-value for the
8–20 year correlation is quite large and is consistent
with the null hypothesis at any standard significance
level.
The statistical evidence against the null hypoth-
esis that there has been no change in the 20–40 year
component of the data is also not strong. This may in
part reflect a lack of power stemming from the rela-
tively small amount of information in the sample
about the 20–40 year frequency component of the data.
But, the p-value may also be overstated for bias rea-
sons. The table indicates that there is a small sample
bias in this correlation, since the small sample mean,
–0.35, is substantially larger than the corresponding
probability limit of –0.45. A bias-adjustment proce-
dure would adjust the coefficients of the estimated
pre-1960s VAR so that the implied small sample mean
lines up better with the pre-1960s empirical estimate of
–0.51. Presumably, such an adjustment procedure would
shift the simulated correlations to the left, reducing
the p-value. It is beyond the scope of our analysis to
develop a suitable bias adjustment method.2 However,
we suspect that, given the large magnitude of the bias,
the bias-corrected p-value would be substantially small-
er than the 14 percent value reported in the table.3
TABLE B1
Testing null hypothesis that post-1960s equal pre-1960s correlations
Small sample Standard deviation,
Frequency Plim mean small sample mean p-value
2–8 year –0.66 –0.61 × 0.0036 2000 0.09
8–20 year –0.36 –0.38 × 0.0079 2000 0.25
20–40 year –0.45 –0.35 × 0.0129 2000 0.14
Notes: Data-generating mechanism in all cases is a three-lag, bivariate VAR fit to pre-1960s data. p-value: frequency, in 2,000
artificial post-1960s datasets, that contemporaneous correlation between the indicated frequency components of x and y exceeds,
in absolute value, the corresponding post-1960s estimate. Plim: mean, over 1,000 artificial samples of length 2,000 observations
each, of correlation. Small sample mean: mean of correlation, across 2,000 artificial post-1960s datasets. Standard deviation,
small sample (product of Monte Carlo standard error for mean and  2000 ): standard deviation of correlations across 2,000
artificial post-1960s datasets.
1We redid the calculations in table B1 using a five-lag VAR and
found that the results were essentially unchanged. The only no-
table differences in the results are that the p-value for the busi-
ness cycle correlations between inflation and unemployment is
0.06 and the p-value for these correlations in the 20–40 year
range is 0.11.
2One could be developed along the lines pursued by Kilian (1998).
3To get a feel for the likely quantitative magnitude of the ef-
fects of bias adjustment, we redid the bootstrap simulations by
adjusting the variance-covariance matrix of the VAR distur-
bances used in the bootstrap simulations. Let V = [V]ij denote
the variance-covariance matrix. In the pre-1960s estimation
results, V1,2 = –0.1024, V1,1 = 0.0018, V2,2 = 6.0653. When we
set the value of V1,2 to –0.0588 and recomputed the entries in
table B1 in box 1, we found that the mean correlations were
as follows: business cycle, –0.75 (0.01); 8–20 year, –0.54 (0.09);
and 20–40 year, –0.51 (0.06). The numbers in parentheses are
the analogs of the p-values in table B1. Note how the mean cor-
relation in the 20–40 year frequency coincides with the empiri-
cal estimate reported in the first row of table 1, and that the
p-value has dropped substantially, from 0.23 to 0.06. This is
consistent with our conjecture that bias adjustment may have
an important impact on the p-value for the 20–40 year correla-
tion. However, the other numbers indicate that the bias adjust-
ment procedure that we applied, by varying V1,2 only, is not a
good one. Developing a superior bias adjustment method is
clearly beyond the scope of this article.30 1Q/2003, Economic Perspectives
FIGURE 4
Measuring money growth and inflation, 1900–60
A. The M2 growth rate and the inflation rate
percent
Note: Shaded areas indicate recessions as defined by the National Bureau of Economic Research.
Source: Authors’ calculations based upon data from the Federal Reserve System and the U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics.
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FIGURE 5
Measuring money growth and inflation, 1960–99
A. The M2 growth rate and the inflation rate
percent
D. Frequency of 1.5 to 8 years
Note: Shaded areas indicate recessions as defined by the National Bureau of Economic Research.
Source: Authors’ calculations based upon data from the Federal Reserve System and the U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics.
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Here, u is the actual rate of unemployment, uN is
the natural rate of unemployment, π is the actual rate
of inflation, and πe is the rate of inflation expected by
the private sector. The magnitude of α controls how
much the actual rate of unemployment falls below its
natural rate when inflation is higher than expected. The
natural rate of unemployment is the unemployment rate
that would occur if there was no surprise in inflation.
The natural rate of unemployment is exogenous to the
model, evolving in response to developments in unem-
ployment insurance, social attitudes toward the unem-
ployed, and other factors.
Note that according to the expectations augmented
Phillips curve, if the monetary authority raises infla-
tion above what people expected, then unemployment
is below its natural rate. The mechanism by which this
occurs is not explicit in the model, but one can easily
imagine how it might work. For example, πe might be
the inflation rate that is expected at the time wage con-
tracts are set. Suppose that expectations of inflation are
low, so that firms and workers agree to low nominal
wages. Suppose that the monetary authority decides—
contrary to expectations at the time wage contracts are
written—to increase inflation by raising money growth.
Given that wages in the economy have been pre-set
at a low level, this translates into a low real wage, which
encourages firms to expand employment and thereby
reduce unemployment.15
The second part of the Barro–Gordon model sum-
marizes the behavior of the monetary authority, which
chooses π. Although the model does not specify the
details of how this control is implemented, we should
think of it happening via the monetary authority’s control
over the money supply. At the time that the monetary
authority chooses π, the value of πe is predetermined.
If the monetary authority can move π above πe, then,
according to the expectations-augmented Phillips curve,
unemployment would dip below the natural rate. It is
assumed that the monetary authority wishes to push
the unemployment rate below its natural rate, and this
is captured by the notion that it would like to minimize:
2) ½ [(u – kuN)2 + γπ2], γ > 0, k < 1.
The first term in parentheses indicates that, ideally,
the monetary authority would like u = kuN < uN. The
model does not specify exactly why the monetary author-
ity wants unemployment below the natural rate. In prin-
ciple, there are various factors that could rationalize this.
For example, the presence of distortionary taxes or mo-
nopoly power could make the level of economic activity
inefficiently low, and this might translate into a natu-
ral rate of unemployment that is suboptimally high.
In practice, the monetary authority would not neces-
sarily go for the ideal level of unemployment, because
the increase in π that this requires entails costs. These
are captured by the γπ2 term in the objective. According
to this term, the ideal level of inflation is zero.16 The
higher the level of inflation, the higher the marginal cost.
The Barro–Gordon model views the monetary
authority as choosing π to optimize its objective, sub-
ject to the expectations-augmented Phillips curve and
to the given value of πe. The optimal choice of π reflects
a balancing of the benefits and costs summarized in
the monetary authority’s objective. A graph of the best
response function appears in figure 6, where πe appears
on the horizontal axis, and π appears on the vertical. The
45-degree line in the figure conveniently shows the level
of inflation that the policymaker would select if it chose
to validate private expectations of inflation.
Note how the best response function is flatter than
the 45-degree line. This reflects the increasing marginal
cost of inflation at higher levels of inflation. At low
levels of expected inflation, the marginal cost of inflation
is low, so the benefits outweigh the costs. At such an
inflation rate, the monetary authority would try to sur-
prise the economy by moving to a higher level. On the
other hand, if expected inflation were very high, then
the marginal cost of going even higher would outweigh
the benefits, and the monetary authority would choose
to violate expectations by choosing a lower inflation
rate. Not surprisingly, there is an inflation rate in the
middle, π*, where the monetary authority chooses not
to surprise the economy at all. This is the inflation rate
where the best response function crosses the 45-degree
line. Because of the linear nature of the expectations-
augmented Phillips curve and the quadratic form of
monetary authority preferences, the best response func-
tion is linear, guaranteeing that there is a single crossing.
What is equilibrium in the model? We assume
everyone—the monetary authority and the private
economy—is rational. In particular, the private econ-
omy understands the monetary authority’s policymaking
process. It knows that if it were to have expectations,
πe < π*, then actual inflation would be higher than πe.
So, it cannot be rational to have an expectation like
this. It also understands that if it were to have expec-
tations, πe > π*, the monetary authority would choose
an inflation rate lower than πe. So, this expectation can-
not be rational either. The only rational thing for the
private economy to expect is π*. So, this is equilibri-
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According to the model, inflation is predicted to
be proportional to the actual level of unemployment.
There are several crucial things to note here. First, the
actual level of unemployment is equal to the natural rate,
because in equilibrium the monetary authority cannot
surprise the private economy. So, monetary policy in
practice does not succeed in driving unemployment be-
low the natural rate at all. Second, inflation is positive,
being proportional to unemployment. This is higher
than its ideal level, here presumed to be zero. These two
observations imply that in equilibrium, all the monetary
authority succeeds in doing is producing an inflation
rate above its ideal level. It makes no headway on unem-
ployment. That is, this optimizing monetary authority
simply succeeds in producing suboptimal outcomes.
How is this possible?
The problem is that the monetary authority lacks
the ability to commit to low inflation. At the time the
monetary authority makes its decision, the private econ-
omy has already formed its expectation about inflation.
The private economy knows that if it expects inflation
to occur at the socially optimal level, πe = 0, then the
monetary authority has an incentive to deviate to a
higher level of inflation (see figure 6).17
Eggertsson (2001) has recently drawn attention
to one of Aesop’s fables, which captures aspects of the
situation nicely. Imagine a lion that has fallen into a
deep pit. Unless it gets out soon, it will starve to death.
A rabbit shows up and the lion implores the rabbit to
push a stick lying nearby into the hole, so that the
lion can climb out. The lion cries out from
the depths of its soul, with a most solemn
commitment not to eat the (juicy-looking)
rabbit once it gets out. But, the rabbit is
skeptical. It understands that the intentions
announced by the lion while in the hole
are not time consistent. While in the hole,
the lion has the incentive to declare, with
complete sincerity, that it will not eat the
rabbit when it gets out. However, that plan
is no longer optimal for the lion when it
is out of the hole. At this point, the lion’s
optimal plan is to eat the rabbit after all.
The rational rabbit, who understands the
time inconsistency of the lion’s optimal
plan, would do well to leave the lion where
it is. What the lion would like while it is
in the hole is a commitment technology:
something that convinces the rabbit that
the lion will have no incentive or ability
to change the plan it announces from the
hole after it is out.
In some respects, the rabbit and the
lion resemble the private economy and the monetary
authority in the Barro–Gordon model. Before πe is
chosen, the monetary authority would like people to
believe that it will choose π = 0. The problem is that
after the private economy sets πe = 0, the monetary au-
thority has an incentive to choose π > πe (see figure 6).
As in the fable, what the monetary authority needs is
some sort of commitment technology, something that
convinces private agents that if they set πe = 0, the mon-
etary authority has no incentive or ability to deviate to
π > 0. Rational agents in an economy where the mone-
tary authority has no such commitment technology do
well to set πe = π* > 0. This puts the monetary author-
ity in the dilemma discussed in the introduction. Its
optimal choice in this case is to validate expectations
by setting π = π* (that is, it chooses C in figure 1).
The crucial point of Kydland–Prescott and Barro–
Gordon is that if the monetary authority has a credible
commitment to low inflation, then better outcomes
would occur than if it has no such ability to commit.
In both cases, the same level of unemployment occurs
(that is, the natural rate), but the authority with com-
mitment achieves the ideal inflation rate, while the mone-
tary authority without commitment achieves a socially
suboptimal higher inflation rate. The problem, as with
the lion in the fable, is coming up with a credible com-
mitment technology. The commitment technology must
be such that the monetary authority actually has no in-
centive to select a high inflation rate after the private
economy selects πe.
FIGURE 6
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What makes adopting a commitment technology
particularly difficult is that the monetary authority’s
preferences in Barro–Gordon (unlike the lion’s pref-
erences in the fable) are fundamentally democratic pref-
erences: They reflect actual social costs and benefits.
Credible commitment technologies must involve basic
changes in monetary institutions, which make them,
in effect, less democratic. Changes that have been adopt-
ed in practice are the legal and other mechanisms that
make central banks independent from the administra-
tive and legislative branches of government. The classic
institutional arrangement used to achieve commitment
has been the gold standard. Tying the money supply
to the quantity of gold greatly limits the ability of the
central bank to manipulate π.
Barro–Gordon and the data
The Barro–Gordon model is surprisingly effective
at explaining key features of the inflation–unemploy-
ment relationship during the twentieth century. It is
perhaps reasonable to suppose that the U.S. monetary
authorities more closely resembled the monetary authori-
ty with commitment in the Barro–Gordon model in the
early part of the last century and more closely resem-
bled the monetary authority without commitment in
the last part of the century. After World War II, the U.S.
government resolved that all branches of government—
including the Federal Reserve—should be committed
to the objective of full employment. This commitment
reflected two views. The first view, apparently validat-
ed by the experience of the Great Depression, is that
activist stabilization policy is desirable. It was codified
into law by the Full Employment Act of 1946. The
second view, associated with the intellectual revolution
of John Maynard Keynes, is that successful activist
stabilization policy is feasible. This view was firmly
entrenched in Washington, DC, by the time of the ar-
rival of the Kennedy administration in 1960. Kennedy’s
Council of Economic Advisors resembles a “who’s
who” of Keynesian economics.18
The notion that policymakers were committed to
low inflation in the early part of the century and rela-
tively more concerned with economic stabilization later
implies, via the Barro–Gordon model, that inflation
in the late period should have been higher than it was
in the early period. Comparison of figure 4, panel A
and figure 5, panel A shows that this is indeed the case.
Another implication of the model is that inflation should
have been constant at zero in the early period, and this
most definitely was not the case (see figure 4, panel A).19
But, this is not a fundamental problem for the model.
There is a simple, natural timing change in the model
that eliminates this implication, without changing the
central message of the analysis in the previous section.
In particular, suppose that the actions of the central
bank have an impact on inflation only with a p-period
delay with p > 0. In this way, the monetary authority
is not able to eliminate the immediate impact of shocks
to the inflation rate. The policymaker with commitment
sets the p-period-ahead expected inflation rate to zero.
Suppose that the analogous timing assumption applies
to the private sector, so that there are movements in
inflation that are not expected at the time it sets πe. Un-
der the expectations-augmented Phillips curve, this
introduces a source of negative correlation between
inflation and unemployment. This sort of delay in the
private sector could be rationalized if wage contracts
extended over p periods of time. Under these timing
assumptions, the prediction of the model under com-
mitment is that the actual inflation rate fluctuates, and
inflation and unemployment covary negatively, as
was actually observed over the early part of the twen-
tieth century. (The appendix analyzes the model with
time delays.) When the monetary authorities drop their
commitment to low inflation in the later part of the
century, the model predicts that unemployment and
inflation move together more closely and that the re-
lationship will actually be positive in the lowest fre-
quencies. In the higher frequencies, the correlation might
still be negative, for the reason that it is negative in
all frequencies when there is commitment: Inflation
in the higher frequencies is hard to control when there
are implementation delays.20 In this sense, the Barro–
Gordon models seems at least qualitatively consistent
with the basic facts about what happened to the infla-
tion–unemployment relationship between the first and
second parts of the past century. It is hard not to be
impressed by this.21
But, there is one shortcoming of the model that
may be of some concern. Recall from figure 3, panel A
that inflation in the early 1980s dropped precipitously,
just as unemployment soared to a postwar high. This
behavior in inflation and unemployment is so pro-
nounced that it has a substantial impact on the very
low frequency component of the data. According to
figure 3, panel F, the 20–40 year component of unem-
ployment lags the corresponding component of infla-
tion by several years. As a technical matter, it is possible
to square this with the model. The version of the model
discussed in the previous paragraph allows for the
possibility that a big negative shock to the price level—
one that was beyond the control of the monetary au-
thority—occurred that drove actual unemployment
up above the natural rate of unemployment. But the
explanation rings hollow. The model itself implies
that, on average, the low frequency component of35 Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
unemployment leads inflation, not the other way around
(see the appendix for an elaboration). This is because
unemployment is related to the incentives to inflate, so
when unemployment rises, one expects inflation to
rise in response. In fact, with the implementation and
observation delays, one expects the rise in inflation
to occur with a delay after a rise in unemployment.
In sum, the Barro–Gordon model seems to provide
a way to understand the change in inflation–unemploy-
ment dynamics between the first and second parts of
the last century. However, the disinflation of the early
1980s raises some problems for the model. That ex-
perience appears to require thinking about the defla-
tion of the early 1980s as an accident. Yet, to all direct
appearances it was no accident at all. Conventional
wisdom takes it for granted that the disinflation was
a direct outcome of intentional efforts taken by the
Federal Reserve, beginning with the appointment of
Paul Volcker as chairman in 1979. Many observers
interpret this experience as a fundamental embarrass-
ment to the Barro–Gordon model. Some would go
further and interpret this as an embarrassment to the
ideas behind it: the notion that time inconsistency is
important for understanding the dynamics of U.S. in-
flation. They argue that, according to the model, the
only way inflation could fall precipitously absent a
drop in unemployment is with substantial institutional
reform to implement commitment. There was no in-
stitutional reform in the early 1980s, so the institu-
tional perspective must, at best, be of second-order
importance for understanding U.S. inflation.
Alternative representation of the notion that
commitment matters
By the standards of our times, the Barro–Gordon
model must be counted a massive success. Its two
simple equations convey some of the most profound
ideas in macroeconomics. In addition, it accounts nicely
for broad patterns in twentieth century data: the fact
that inflation on average was higher in the second half,
and the changed nature of the unemployment–infla-
tion relationship.
Yet, the model encounters problems understand-
ing the disinflation of the 1980s. Perhaps this is a prob-
lem for the specific equations of the model. But, is it
a problem for the ideas behind the model? We just do
not know yet, because the ideas have not been stud-
ied in a sufficiently wide range of economic models.
Efforts to incorporate the basic ideas of Kydland–
Prescott and Barro–Gordon into modern models have
only just begun. This process has been slow, in part
because the computational challenge of this task is
enormous. Indeed, the computational difficulties of
these models serve as another reminder of the power
of the original Barro–Gordon model: With it, the read-
er can reach the core ideas armed simply with a sheet
of paper and a pencil.
Why should we incorporate the ideas into modern
models? First, the ideas have proved enormously pro-
ductive in helping us understand the broad features of
inflation in the twentieth century. This suggests that
they deserve further attention. Second, as we will see
below, when we do incorporate the ideas into modern
models, unexpected results occur. They may provide
additional possibilities for understanding the data. Third,
because modern models are explicitly based on micro-
foundations, they offer opportunities for econometric
estimation and testing that go well beyond what is
possible with the original Barro–Gordon model. In
modern models, crucial parameters like α, k, and γ
are related explicitly to production functions, to fea-
tures of labor and product markets, to properties of
utility functions, and to the nature of information trans-
mission among agents. These linkages make it possi-
ble to bring a wealth of data to bear, beyond data on
just inflation and unemployment. In the original Barro–
Gordon model, α, k, and γ are primitive parameters,
so the only way to obtain information on them is us-
ing the data on inflation and unemployment itself.
To see the sort of things that can happen when the
ideas of Kydland–Prescott and Barro–Gordon are in-
corporated into modern models, we briefly summarize
some recent work of Albanesi, Chari, and Christiano
(2002).22 They adapt a version of the classic monetary
model of Lucas and Stokey (1983), so that it incorpo-
rates benefits of unexpected inflation and costs of in-
flation that resemble the factors Barro and Gordon
appeal to informally to justify the specification of their
model. However, because the model is derived using
standard specifications of preferences and technology,
there is no reason to expect that the monetary author-
ity’s best response function is linear, as in the Barro–
Gordon model (recall figure 6). Indeed, Albanesi, Chari,
and Christiano find that for almost all parameteriza-
tions for the model, if there is any equilibrium at all
there must be two. That is, the best response function
is nonlinear, and has the shape indicated in figure 7.
In one respect, it should not be a surprise that there
might be multiple equilibriums in a Barro–Gordon
type model. Recall that an equilibrium is a level of in-
flation where benefits of additional unexpected infla-
tion just balance the associated costs. But we can expect
that these costs and benefits change nonlinearly for
higher and higher levels of inflation. If so, then there
could be multiple levels of inflation where equilibrium
occurs, as in figure 7.36 1Q/2003, Economic Perspectives
There is one version of the Albanesi–
Chari–Christiano model in which the in-
tuition for the multiplicity is particularly
simple. In that version, private agents
can, at a fixed cost, undertake actions to
protect themselves against inflation. In
principle, such actions may involve ac-
quiring foreign currency deposits for use
in transactions. Or, they may involve
fixed costs of retaining professional assis-
tance in minimizing cash balances when
inflation is high. Although these efforts
are costly for individuals, they do mean
that on the margin, the costs of inflation
are reduced from the perspective of a be-
nevolent monetary authority. Turning to
figure 7, one might imagine that at low
levels of inflation, the basic Barro–Gordon
model applies. People do not undertake
fixed costs to protect themselves against
inflation, and the best response function
looks roughly linear, cutting the 45-de-
gree line at the lower level of inflation in-
dicated in the figure. At higher levels of inflation,
however, people do start to undertake expensive fixed
costs to insulate themselves. By reducing the marginal
cost of inflation, this has the effect of increasing the in-
centive for the monetary authority to raise inflation. Of
course, this assumes that the benefits of inflation do
not simultaneously decline. In the Albanesi–Chari–
Christiano model, in fact they do not decline. This is why
in this version of their model, the best response func-
tion eventually begins to slope up again and, therefore,
to cross the 45-degree line at a higher level of inflation.
The previous example is designed to just present
a flavor of the Albanesi–Chari–Christiano results. In
fact, the shape of the best response function resembles
qualitatively the picture in figure 7, even in the ab-
sence of opportunities for households to protect them-
selves from inflation.
What are the implications of this result? Essen-
tially, there are new ways to understand the fact that
inflation is sometimes persistently high and at other
times (like now) persistently low. In the Barro–Gordon
model, this can only be explained by appealing to a
fundamental variable that shifts the best response func-
tion. The disinflation of the early 1980s suggests that
it may be hard to find such a variable in practice.
But, is a model with multiple equilibriums testable?
Perhaps. Inspection of figure 7 suggests one possibil-
ity. Shocks to the fundamental variables that determine
the costs and benefits of inflation from the perspective
of the monetary authority have the effect of shifting
the best response curve up and down. Notice how the
high-inflation equilibrium behaves differently from
the low-inflation equilibrium as the best response
function, say, shifts up. Inflation in the low-inflation
equilibrium rises, and in the high-inflation equilibri-
um it falls. Thus, these shocks have an opposite cor-
relation with inflation in the two equilibriums. This sign
switch in equilibriums is an implication of the model
that can, in principle, be tested. For example, Albanesi–
Chari–Christiano explore the model’s implication that
interest rates and output covary positively in the low-
inflation equilibrium and negatively in the high-inflation
equilibrium. Using data drawn from over 100 coun-
tries, they find evidence in support of this hypothesis.
But, the Albanesi–Chari–Christiano model is still
too simple to draw final conclusions about the impli-
cations of lack of commitment for the dynamics of
inflation. The model has been kept very simple so that—
like the Barro-Gordon model—it can be analyzed with
a sheet of paper and a pencil (well, perhaps one would
need two sheets of paper!). We know from separate
work on problems with a similar logical structure that
when models are made truly dynamic, say with the
introduction of investment, the properties of equilib-
riums can change in fundamental ways (see, for ex-
ample, Krusell and Smith, 2002). It still remains to
explore the implications of lack of commitment in such
models. In particular, it is important to explore wheth-
er the disinflation experience of the early 1980s, which
FIGURE 7
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appears to be a problem for the Barro–Gordon model,
can be reconciled with modern models.
Conclusion
We characterized the change in the nature of in-
flation dynamics before and after the 1960s. We re-
viewed various theories about inflation, but put special
focus on the institutions view: theories that focus on
lack of commitment in monetary policy as the culprit
behind bad inflation outcomes. We argued that this
view, as captured in the famous model of Barro and
Gordon (1983a, b), accounts well for the broad out-
lines of the data. Not only does it capture the fact that
inflation was, on average, lower in the early period
of the twentieth century than in the later period, but it
also accounts for the shift that occurred in the unem-
ployment–inflation dynamics. In the early period, in-
flation and unemployment exhibit a negative relationship
at all frequency bands. In the later period, the nega-
tive relationship persists in the higher frequency bands,
while a positive relationship emerges in the low fre-
quencies. We show how the Barro–Gordon model
can account for this shift as reflecting the notion that
monetary policy was credibly committed to low in-
flation in the early period, while it abandoned that
commitment in the later period.
Although the model does well on these broad facts,
it has some well-known difficulties addressing the dis-
inflation in the U.S. in the 1980s. This, among other
considerations, motivates the recent research on the
implications of absence of commitment in monetary
policy. We show that that research uncovers some sur-
prising—relative to the original Barro–Gordon analy-
sis—implications of lack of commitment. These may
ultimately prove helpful for achieving a better model
of inflation dynamics. But that research has a long way
to go, before we fully understand the implications of
absence of commitment in monetary policy.
What is at stake in this work? If absence of com-
mitment is in fact the primary reason for the poor in-
flation outcomes of the past, then research on ways
to improve inflation outcomes needs to focus on im-
proved design of monetary institutions.
1This belief is based in part on the evidence (see, for example, Barsky
and Kilian, 2000, for a discussion of the role of money growth in
the 1970s inflation). But, it is also based on the view that good
economic theory implies a close connection—at least over hori-
zons as long as a decade—between money growth and inflation.
Recently, some economists’ confidence in the existence of a close
connection between money growth and inflation has been shaken
by the discovery, in seemingly well-specified economic models,
that the connection can be surprisingly weak. For example, Loyo
(1999) uses the “fiscal theory of the price level” to argue that it
was a high nominal interest rate that initiated the rise in inflation
in Brazil, and that this rise in the interest rate was in a meaningful
sense not “caused” by high money growth. Loyo drives home his
point that it was not high money growth that caused the high in-
flation by articulating it in a model in which there is no money.
For a survey of the fiscal theory, and of Loyo’s argument in par-
ticular, see Christiano and Fitzgerald (2000). Others argue that
standard economic theories imply a much weaker link than was
once thought, between inflation and money growth. For example,
Benhabib, Schmitt-Grohé, and Uribe (2001a, b) and Krugman
(1998) argue that it is possible for there to be a deflation even in the
presence of positive money growth. Christiano and Rostagno
(2001) and Christiano (2000) review these arguments, respec-
tively. In each case, they argue that the deflation, high money
growth scenario depends on implausible assumptions.
2This description of economists’ research strategy is highly stylized.
In some cases, the model is not made formally explicit. In other
cases, the model is explicit, but the data plays only a small role in
building confidence in the model.
3Prominent recent papers that draw attention to the inertia puzzle in-
clude Chari, Kehoe, and McGrattan (2000), and Mankiw (2001).
Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (2001) describe variants of standard
macroeconomic models that can account quantitatively for the inertia.
NOTES
4The first, second, and aspects of the fourth observations have been
made before. To our knowledge the third observation was first made
in Christiano and Fitzgerald (2003). For a review of the first two
observations, see Blanchard (2002). For a discussion of the fourth
using data on the second half of the twentieth century, see King
and Watson (1994), King, Stock, and Watson (1995), Sargent (1999),
Staiger, Stock, and Watson (1997), and Stock and Watson (1998).
5In this respect, our analysis resembles that of Ireland (1999), al-
though his analysis focuses on data from the second half of the
twentieth century only, while we analyze both halves.
6For a critical review of the Clarida, Gali, and Gertler argument, see
Christiano and Gust (2000). Other arguments that fall into what
we are calling the people category include Sargent (1999). Sargent
argues that periodically, the data line up in such a way that there
appears to be a Phillips curve with a favorable trade-off between
inflation and unemployment. High inflation then results as the cen-
tral bank attempts to exploit this to reduce unemployment. As em-
phasized in Sargent (1999, chapter 9), the high inflation of the 1970s
represents a challenge for this argument. This is because the domi-
nant fact about the early part of this decade was the apparent “death”
of the Phillips curve: Policymakers and students of the macroeconomy
were stunned by the fact that inflation and unemployment both
increased at the time.
7The different frequency components of the data are extracted us-
ing the band pass filter method summarized in Christiano and
Fitzgerald (1998) and explained in detail in Christiano and
Fitzgerald (2003).
8It is worth emphasizing that, by “Phillips curve,” we mean a sta-
tistical relationship, and not necessarily a relationship exploitable
by policy.38 1Q/2003, Economic Perspectives
9The slope of the regression line drawn through the scatter plot of
points in figure 2, panel B is –0.42, with a t-statistic of 3.77 and
an R² of 0.20.
10Specifically, they are p-values for testing the null hypothesis that
there is no relationship at any frequency between the two variables,
against the alternative that the correlation is in fact the one reported
in the table. These p-values are computed using the following
bootstrap procedure. We fit separate q-lag scalar autoregressive
representations to the level of inflation (first difference, log CPI)
and to the level of the unemployment rate. We used random draws
from the fitted disturbances and actual historical initial conditions
to simulate 2,000 artificial datasets on inflation and unemploy-
ment. For annual data, q = 3; for monthly, q = 12; and for quarterly,
q = 8. The datasets on unemployment and inflation are independent
by construction. In each artificial dataset, we compute correlations
between the various frequency components, as we did in the actual
data. In the data and the simulations, we dropped the first and last
three years of the filtered data before computing sample correla-
tions. The numbers in parentheses in table 1 are the frequency of
times that the simulated correlation is greater than the estimated
correlation is positive. If it is negative, we compute the frequency
of times that the simulated correlation is less than the simulated
value. These are p-values under the null hypothesis that there is
no relationship between the inflation and unemployment data.
11Figure 3 exhibits monthly observations on inflation and unemploy-
ment. To reduce the high frequency fluctuations in inflation, figure 3,
panel A exhibits the annual average of inflation, rather than the
monthly inflation rate. The scatter plot in figure 3, panel B is based
on the same data used in figure 3, panel A. Figure 3, panels C–F
are based on monthly inflation, that is, 1,200log(CPIt-1/CPIt–1),
and unemployment. The line in figure 3, panel B represents a re-
gression line drawn through the scatter plot. The slope of that
line, based on monthly data covering the period 1959:Q2–98:Q1,
is 0.47 with a t-statistic of 5.2.
12Consistent with these observations, when inflation and unemploy-
ment are detrended using a linear trend with a break in slope (not
level) in 1980:Q4 for inflation and 1983:Q1 for unemployment,
the scatter plots of the detrended variables show a negative relation-
ship. The regression of detrended inflation on detrended unemploy-
ment has a coefficient of –0.31, with t-statistic of –4.24 and R² =
0.037. The slope coefficient is similar to what was obtained in note 9
for the pre-1960s period, but the R² is considerably smaller.
13See King and Watson (1994), Stock and Watson (1998), and
Sargent (1999, p. 12), who apply the band-pass filtering techniques
proposed in Baxter and King (1999). The relationship between
the Baxter–King band-pass filtering methods and the method
used here is discussed in Christiano and Fitzgerald (2003).
14See, for example, Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (2001).
15In the years since the expectations-augmented Phillips curve was
first proposed, evidence has accumulated against it. For example,
Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (2001) display evidence that
suggests that inflation surprises are not the mechanism by which
shocks, including monetary policy shocks, are transmitted to the
real economy. Although the details of the mechanism underlying the
expectations-augmented Phillips curve seem rejected by the data,
the basic idea is still very much a part of standard models. Namely, it
is the unexpected component of monetary policy that impacts on
the economy via the presence of some sort of nominal rigidity.
16Extending the analysis to the case where the socially optimal
level of inflation is non-zero (even, random) is straightforward.
17In later work, Barro and Gordon (1983a) pointed out that there
exist equilibriums in which reputational considerations play a role.
In such equilibriums, a monetary authority might choose to vali-
date πe = 0 out of concern that if it does not do so, then in the next
period πe will be an extremely large number with the consequence
that whatever they do then, the social consequences will be bad.
In this article, we do not consider these “trigger strategy” equilib-
riums, and instead limit ourselves to Markov equilibriums, in
which decisions are limited to be functions only of the economy’s
current state. In the present model, there are no state variables,
and so decisions, πe and π, are simply constants. A problem with
allowing the presence of reputational considerations is that they
support an extremely large set of equilibriums. Essentially, any-
thing can happen and the theory becomes vacuous.
18It would be interesting to understand why earlier monetary au-
thorities were relatively less concerned with stabilizing the economy
and more committed, for example, to the gold standard.
19As mentioned in an earlier note, the model does not require that the
optimal level of inflation is literally zero. Implicitly, what we are
assuming is that the optimal level of inflation, πo in the note, is much
smoother than the inflation rate actually observed in the early sample.
20These observations are established in the appendix.
21The argument we have just made is similar in spirit to the one
that appears in Ireland (1999).
22This builds on previous work by Chari, Christiano, and
Eichenbaum (1998).39 Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
APPENDIX: INFLATION–UNEMPLOYMENT COVARIANCE FUNCTION IN THE IMPLEMENTATION-DELAY
VERSION OF BARRO–GORDON MODEL
This appendix works out the covariance implications of a version of the Barro–Gordon model with implemen-
tation delays (implementation delays are discussed in Barro and Gordon [1983, pp. 601–602]). The particular
version we consider is the one proposed in Ireland (1999). We work out the model’s implications for the type
of frequency-domain statistics analyzed in the text. In particular, we seek the covariance properties of inflation
and unemployment, when we consider only a specified subset of frequency components (high, business cycle,
low, and very low) of these variables.
We obtain two sets of results. One pertains to the commitment version of the model and the other to the
no-commitment version:
■ It is possible to parameterize the commitment version of the model so that the covariance between inflation
and unemployment is negative for all subsets of frequency components.
■ In the no-commitment version of the model, the covariance between inflation and unemployment can be
positive in the very low frequency components of the data and negative in the higher frequency components.
Unemployment does not lag inflation in the very low frequency data, and it may actually lead, depending on
parameter values.
The idea is that policymakers can only influence the p-period ahead forecast of inflation, not actual inflation.
With this change, the objective of the policymaker is E–p [(u –kuN)2 + γπ2]/2. Actual inflation, π, is  ˆ π=π+θ∗η,
where  ˆ π is a variable chosen p ≥ 0 periods in the past by the policymaker, and θ * η captures the shocks that
impact π between the time  ˆ π is set and π is realized. Here,
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where ηt is white noise and L is the lag operator, Ljηt=ηt–j. The policymaker’s problem is optimized by setting
ˆˆ
N u π=ψ , where  ˆ
N u is the forecast of the period t natural rate of unemployment, made p periods in the past,
ˆ
NN
tt p t uE u − = , computable at the time  ˆ π is selected and x is defined in the text. Following Ireland (1999), we
suppose that uN has a particular unit root time series representation:
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We suppose that πe in the expectations augmented Phillips curve is the p-period ahead forecast of inflation
made by private agents. We impose rational expectations,  ˆ
e π= π . Then, it is easy to verify that when there is
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π= ψ ν+ θ η = ν− α θ η
−λ −
respectively. We make the simplifying assumption that all shocks are uncorrelated with each other. Outcomes
when there is commitment are found by replacing ψ in the above expression with 0. In this case, it is easy to
see that the covariance between inflation and unemployment is unambiguously negative. Under no commitment,
it is possible for this correlation to be positive.
It is convenient to express the joint representation of the variables as follows:
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Denote the covariance function of xt by
() ,
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for k = 0, ±1, ±2, ... . We want to understand the properties of the covariance function,  1, tt Eu − π !!  where  t π !  is
the component of πt in a subset of frequencies, and  t u !  is the component of ut in the same subset of frequencies.
For this, some results in spectral analysis are useful (see Sargent [1987, chapter 11], or, for a simple review,
see Christiano and Fitzgerald [1998]). The spectral density of a stochastic process at frequency ω∈ (–π, π) is
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The inverse Fourier transform result is convenient for us, because in practice there exists a very simple, direct
way to compute S(ω).
Let S(ω) denote the spectral density of xt, after a band-pass filter has been applied to xt to isolate a subset
of frequencies. Then,
S(ω) = F (e–iω)VF(eiω)′,
where V is the variance-covariance matrix of (vt, ηt). Here, V = [Vij] and 
2
11 t VE =ν , V12 = Evtηt, 
2
22 t V =η . Eval-
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s (ω,l) = Sπu (ω)eiωl + Sπu (–ω)e–iωl, ω ∈(–π, π).
There are two features of the covariance function, Eπtut–l, that we wish to emphasize. First, in the case of
commitment, when ψ is replaced by 0 in Sπu(ω), it is possible to choose parameters so that Eπtut–l ≤0 for all l,


















 π= − θ + ω  π
=
∫
Second, when there is commitment so that ψ = α (1 – k)/γ, then the covariance in the very low frequency com-
ponents of inflation and unemployment is positive over substantial leads and lags. Also, there unemployment
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To see this, note that s(ω, l) can be broken into three parts, corresponding to the coefficients on V11, V12,
and V22, respectively. For ω in the neighborhood of zero, the coefficient on V22 is obviously bounded, since
θ (e–iω) θ (eiω) is bounded for all ω ∈ (–π, π). The same is true for the coefficient on V12, although this requires
more algebra to establish. Finally, the coefficient on V11 is not bounded. For ω close enough to zero, this ex-
pression is arbitrarily large. For this reason, for ω close enough to zero this expression dominates the whole
covariance. To establish the remainder of the second result, we now examine more closely the expression in
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1In general, it achieves its maximal value for any l such that ω (l – p) = 2πn, where n is an arbitrary integer. So, the full set of values for
which it achieves its maximum is
2






Since at the moment we are considering small values of ω, values of l not associated with n = 0 are not of interest.
Since Eπtut–l is just the integral of s(ω, l), we can understand the former by studying the latter. Consider
first the case, λ = 0, when 
N
t u  is a pure random walk. In this case, s (ω, l), viewed as a function of l, is a cosine
function that achieves its maximum value at l = p.1 A rough estimate, based on the results in Christiano,
Eichenbaum, and Evans (2001), of the time it takes for monetary policy to have its maximal impact on the
price level is two years. This suggests that a value of p corresponding to two years is sensible. Our notion of
very low frequencies corresponds to periods of fluctuation, 20–40 years, or 10p–20p. In terms of frequencies,
this translates into ω ∈ [2π/(20p), 2π/(10p)]. If we suppose the data are quarterly, then p = 8. For this case, we
find that s (ω, l) is positive for l ∈ (–10, 30) when ω = 2π/(10p) and positive for l ∈ (–30, 50) when ω = 2π/
(20p). We can conclude that the covariance over the very low frequencies is positive for l ∈ (–10, 30), with un-
employment leading inflation by eight periods.
When we repeated this exercise for λ = 0.999, we found that the covariance over the very low frequencies
is maximized for l somewhere between l = 0 and l = 1, and it is positive in the entire range, l ∈ (–20, 20). The
empirically relevant value of λ is smaller (Ireland, 1999, reports a value in the neighborhood of 0.6), and the
results we obtained for this lie in between the reports just reported for the λ = 0 and 0.999 cases. This establish-
es our second set of results.44 1Q/2003, Economic Perspectives
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